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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
The Plaintiff, Ms. Pamela Stephen, prevailed in her legal malpractice case against Attorney 
Scott Gatewood, and the law firm of Sallaz & Gatewood, Chartered in the district court. Judge 
McLaughlin concluded that Ms. Stephen had met her burden and proved Mr. Gatewood's conduct 
fell below the requisite standard of care and conduct while representing Ms. Stephen in a divorce 
case and awarded her damages. The district court also ruled that the other member ofthe firm, 
Appellant Dennis Sallaz, was shielded from liability because he did not provide legal services 
directly to Ms. Stephen and because Sallaz had not supervised Attorney Gatewood. 
This appeal and cross appeal arises from the district court's denial of the Appellant's 
request for attorney fees and Cross Appellant's request for certain discretionary costs and for 
attorney fees. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The Respondent generally agrees with the Appellant's rendition of the proceedings in the 
district court and adds that the Respondent timely filed her Cross Appeal on March 23, 2009. (R., 
pp.88-91.) 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS - APPEAL and CROSS APPEAL 
Ms. Stephen originally filed suit pro se against the law firm of Sallaz & Gatewood, CHID, 
and Scott Gatewood, individually. (R., p. 3.) 
Ms. Stephen subsequently retained counsel who, upon reviewing the allegations in the 
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original complaint and after discussing her current medical conditions, filed a motion in the 
district court for appointment of a guardian ad litem and affidavits in support of the motion. (See, 
RespondentJCross-Appellant's 12/22/09 Motion to Augment the Record on Appeal, documents 1, 
2, and 3.) The district court conducted a hearing on February 26, 2007, and thereafter issued an 
Order Granting Motion For Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem for Plaintiff and appointing 
Attorney Robert Wallace as Ms. Stephen's guardian. (See, RespondentJCross-Appellant's 
12/22/09 Motion to Augment the Record on Appeal, document 4.) 
In May 2007, Ms. Stephen moved to amend her Complaint to include Defendant Sallaz as 
an individual defendant. In this amended pleading, Ms. Stephen stated her belief regarding 
Defendant Sallaz. 
6. The Defendant required that Pamela review and sign an "Employment Agreement" 
in which they represented to Pamela she h~d hired the "the office to represent you." 
Thereafter, both Dennis Sallaz and G. Scott Gatewood were listed as Pamela's 
attorneys in pleadings filed in the divorce case. Additionally, Defendant Sallaz was the 
senior attorney and was responsible for supervising Defendant Gatewood. 
Thereafter, Ms. Stephen referred to the "Defendants" collectively in the remainder of her 
amended pleading. (See, AppellantJCross-Respondent's 12/21109 Motion to Augment the Record 
on Appeal, document 3.) 
On June 26, 2007, Defendants Sallaz & Gatewood, CHID. and Defendant Gatewood, after 
having received Ms. Stephen'S motion to amend which included a copy of the proposed Amended 
Complaint, stipulated to allow Ms. Stephen to amend her complaint without objection. (See, 
AppellantJCross-Respondent's 12/21109 Motion to Augment the Record on Appeal, document 1.) 
The district court granted the Motion to Amend Complaint, and Ms. Stephen filed her 
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Amended Complaint on June 26, 2007. (See, AppellantiCross-Respondent's 12/21109 Motion to 
Augment the Record on Appeal, documents 2 and 3.) 
Ultimately, on October 16,2007, Attorney Charles Crafts filed an Answer to Amended 
Complaint on behalf of Defendant Sallaz, and stated, "This answering Defendant is without 
sufficient i'1formation to either admit or deny the allegations set forth in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 
10, II. .. and therefore denies the same." (Emphasis added) Sallaz then filed, 
contemporaneously with his Answer, a "Verification of Answer to Amended Complaint," in 
which Sallaz stated "upon oath," " ... he has read the Answer to the Amended Complaint as 
prepared by his counsel, and that the facts therein stated are true to the best of his knowledge and 
belief." (See, AppellantiCross-Respondent's 12/21109 Motion to Augment the Record on Appeal, 
documents 4 and 6.) 
Ms. Stephen sought the amendment based on the Sallaz & Gatewood, CHTD. 
employment agreement that indicated Ms. Stephen was hiring "the office to represent you," and 
that the firm consisted of "Attorneys and Counselors at Law," not just Mr. Gatewood, (See, 
AppellantiCross-Respondent's 12/21109 Motion to Augment the Record on Appeal, Trial Exhibit 
100.), and based on the pleadings Sallaz & Gatewood filed in the underlying divorce case. (See, 
RespondentiCross-Appellant's 12122/09 Motion to Augment the Record on Appeal, Trial Exhibit 
102.) The caption that Sallaz and Gatewood affixed to each pleading in the divorce action 
indicated, according to Rule lO(a)(l), IRCP, that both Sallaz and Gatewood had appeared as Ms. 
Stephen's attorneys of record. 
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DENNIS J. SALLAZ, ISB No. 1053 
G. SCOTT GATEWOOD, ISB No. 5982 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD. CHTD. 
Attorneys at Law 
P.O. Box 8956 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone: (208) 336-1145 
Facsimile: (20S) 336-1263 
At trial, Sallaz' counsel stipulated that Sallaz' name appeared on all of the divorce case 
pleadings, as indicated above. (TR., p. 123, LL. 7-10.) 
Ms. Stephen believed that while Idaho Code § 30- I 306, may provide a liability shield to 
uninvolved members of a law firm in a malpractice claim, by appearing of record in the divorce 
case, Sallaz owed Ms. Stephen all duties a representing attorney owes to a client, including 
supervising junior attorneys, like Mr. Gatewood. (R., Exhibit 6, Affidavit of Plaintiff's Counsel 
Filed In Opposition To Defendant Sallaz' Motion For Costs and Fees and Defendant Sallaz' Claim 
For Sanctions, filed December 12, 200S.) 
Sallaz never filed a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion before trial 
seeking dismissal based on his alleged non-involvement in the case. (R., pp. 3-13.) 
At trial, Sallaz testified he never met Ms. Stephen and that he did not supervise Gatewood, 
but could not explain why his name appeared on all pleadings in the divorce case. Sallaz also 
testified he was a "director" of Sallaz & Gatewood, CHID, a professional corporation. (TR., pp. 
107-135.) 
Ultimately, after hearing testimony at trial, Judge McLaughlin ruled, " ... Defendant 
Dennis Sallaz as an individual was not personally liable to the Plaintiff because Sallaz & 
RESPONDENT-CROSS APPELLANT'S OPENlNG BRIEF - 5 
Gatewood, Chartered as a professional corporation shielded Mr. Sallaz from personal liability. 
There was no evidence presented to the Court that Mr. Sallaz provided legal services directly to 
the Plaintiff or that he acted in a supervisory capacity over Mr. Gatewood." (R., p. 62, LL. 17-21.) 
Following trial, Judge McLaughlin directed the parties to provide proposed fmdings of 
facts and conclusion ofJaw. In Sallaz' proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, he 
requested attorney fees according to I.C. § 12-120(3), and he argued that he was the "prevailing 
party." (See, AppellantJCross-Respondent's 12/21109 Motion to Augment the Record on Appeal, 
document 7.) 
Notwithstanding Sallaz' claim and arguments he was the prevailing party and entitled to 
attorney fees, Judge McLaughlin ultimately ruled that Ms. Stephen alone was the prevailing party. 
"THEREFORE, the Court will find that Plaintiffhas prevailed in these proceedings and is entitled 
to judgment in the amount of $27,435.00." (Emphasis added) (See, AppellantJCross-Respondent's 
12/21109 Motion to Augment the Record on Appeal, document 8.) (Emphasis added) 
Judge McLaughlin signed a Judgment on November 28, 2008 and the Clerk entered the 
Judgment on December 1, 2008. (See, AppellantJCross-Respondent's 12121109 Motion to 
Augment the Record on Appeal, document 9.) 
On December 2, 2008, Sallaz filed a Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, in which he 
stated, "The legal basis for the Plaintiff's [sic] motion is set forth in Idaho Code § 12-120 and § 
12-121 and Rule 54(d) and (e), of the Idaho Rules ofCiviJ Procedure." (R., pp. 14-15.) 
Sallaz also filed a Memorandum of Fees and Costs and two affidavits in support of his 
motions. However, unlike in his proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Sallaz 
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presented no facts or argument supporting his contention he was the prevailing party. (R., 
Exhibits 1,2, and 3.) 
On December 12, 2008, Ms. Stephen filed her objection to Sallaz' claim for cost and 
attorney fees, and filed an affidavit in support of her objection. (R., pp. 26-37, and R., Exhibit 6.) 
Among Ms. Stephen's other objection, she specifically objected to the per-hour fee of $250.00 Mr. 
Crafts purported to charge as being exorbitant. 
Judge McLaughlin conducted oral argument on January 15, 2009, in which Mr. Crafts 
participated on behalf of Mr. Sallaz. (TR., pp. 629-668.) 
Ms. Stephen argued Judge McLaughlin had already ruled Ms. Stephen was lone prevailing 
party, so no basis existed under any rule or statute to award or apportion costs or attorney fees to 
any other party. !d. 
Additionally, during the hearing Ms. Stephen's counsel discovered he had not attached the 
guardian ad litem's cost infonnation to his motion. (TR., p. 645, LL. 13-25, p. 646, LL. 1-8.) 
Counsel did not discover this oversight before the hearing because none of the Defendants 
objected to the lack of documentation. 
On January 22, 2009, this Court released the City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 201 
P.3d 629 (2009) opinion in which it ruled attorney fees were mandatory to the prevailing party in a 
legal malpractice case. 
Thereafter, on February 9, 2009, Judge McLaughlin filed his Memorandum Decision 
addressing the parties' respective motions for costs and attorney fees. (R., pp. 61-72.) 
Upon review of the district court's ruling on the Plaintiff's request for discretiouary costs 
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of$7,500 to compensate her for payments to her guardian ad litem, Ms. Stephen's counsel timely 
filed a Motion to Reconsider, (R., pp. 76-78.), and a memorandum and affidavits in support of the 
motion, which included the documents that Counsel believed he had attached to the original 
motion for costs. (R., Exhibits 8, 9, 10, and 11.) 
The district court refused to consider the new evidence and summarily dismissed the 
Motion to Reconsider. 
Appellants Sallaz, Gatewood, and Sallaz & Gatewood, CHTD. filed their Notice of Appeal 
on March 19,2009. (R., pp. 82-87.) 
On July 27, 2009, this Court entered an Order granting the Respondent's Motion to 
Dismiss Appeal and ruled that the December 1, 2008 judgment was a "final judgment from which 
no appeal was taken." This Court then concluded, "The issues in this appeal are limited to the 
Attorneys Fees, Costs, and Pre-judgment Interest. (Supreme Court Order, Ref. No. 09S-296.) 
D. STANDARD OF REVIEW - APPEAL 
Sallaz contends review of a decision denying a motion for attorney fees under Idaho Code 
§ 12-120(3) "presents a question oflaw that is subject to free review by the appellate court." 
While this may be true, the actual issue presented is whether Judge McLaughlin erred when he 
ruled Sallaz was not a prevailing party. "A determination on prevailing parties is committed to the 
discretion of the trial court and we review the determination on an abuse of discretion standard." 
Eighteen Mile Ranch v. Nord Excavating, 141 Idaho 716, 718-19,117 P.3d 130,132-33 (2005), 
citing Burns v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480,486-87,65 P.3d 502, 508-09 (2003). The abuse of 
discretion standard is therefore the proper standard applicable to this appeal. 
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E. STANDARD OF REVIEW - CROSS APPEAL 
The grant or denial of an award of discretionary costs is reviewed on appeal as an abuse of 
discretion. Hayden Lake Fire Pro/ec. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 314,109 P.3d 161,168 
(2005). 
The grant or denial of an award of attorney fees according to I.C. § 12-120(3) to the 
prevailing party, involves the "interpretation and application" of this statute, and therefore, is 
subject to free review. Rahas v. VerMett, 141 Idaho 412, 414, II P.3d 97,99 (2005). Awarding 
attorney fees to the prevailing party according to I.C. § 12-120(3) in a legal malpractice case is 
mandatory. City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 665, 201 P.2d 629,638 (2009). 
II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Whether the Appellant filed his appeal timely? 
2. Whether the Respondent is entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees on appeal 
according to Rule 40, IAR, Rule 41, IAR and I.e. § 12-120(3)? 
III. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL 
I. Whether the Trial Court erred when it denied the Cross Appellant's request for costs she 
incurred to pay her guardian ad litem, which the Court ordered to be appointed? 
2. Whether the Trial Court erred when it failed to award attorney fees according to I.C. § 12-
120(3) to the Cross Appellant when she was the prevailing party in her legal malpractice 
case? 
3. Whether the Cross Appellant is entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees on this cross 
appeal according to Rule 40, JAR, Rule 41, IARand I.C. § 12-120(3)? 
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IV. 
ARGUMENT - APPEAL 
A. APPELLANT SALLAZ FAILED TO FILE IDS APPEAL TIMELY. 
In Sallaz' appeal the threshold question is not whether Sallaz is entitled to attorney fees, 
but whether or not Sallaz was a prevailing party, a requisite for an award of attorney fees under 
I.C. § 12-120(3). This distinction is important because Sallaz briefed and Judge McLaughlin 
considered and decided the prevailing-party issue before the district court entered the December 1, 
2008 Judgment. 
The record is clear that Sallaz, in his proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
filed September 9, 2008, raised and argued the prevailing-party issue. Sallaz stated the correct 
standard; "In considering a request for Attorney fees under section 12-120(3), the trial court must 
first determine whether any litigant is the 'prevailing party,' a decision committed to the discretion 
of the trial court." Sallaz then cited to Rule 54(d)(I)(B), IRCP as the appropriate rule the district 
court should apply when considering who prevailed in the case. Finally, Sallaz presented extensive 
argument in his proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to support his claim he was the 
prevailing party in the case. (See, AppellantlCross-Respondent's 12121/09 Motion to Augment the 
Record on Appeal, document 7, pp. 5-7.) 
Thereafter, Judge McLaughlin entered his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment, in which Judge McLaughlin ruled that Ms. Stephen was the prevailing party. 
"THEREFORE, the Court will find that Plaintiff has prevailed in these proceedings and is entitled 
to judgment in the amount of $27,435.00." (See, AppellantlCross-Respondent's 12/21109 Motion 
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to Augment the Record on Appeal, document 8.) 
Previously, this Court granted the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss all issues arising from 
the December I, 2009 judgment, as that judgment was a final judgment from which the Appellants 
failed to appeal. As Sallaz raised and argued he was a prevailing party and Judge McLaughlin 
considered and ruled on tbis issue prior to the December 1, 2008 judgment, to raise this issue now 
on appeal is untimely. Consequently, as Sallaz did not timely appeal the December I, 2008 
judgment and contend Judge McLaughlin had erred by denying him status as a prevailing party, 
then Sallaz' appeal on this issue is untimely and must be dismissed. 
B. JUDGE MCLAUGHLIN CORRECTLY RULED MS. STEPHEN WAS THE PREVAILING 
PARTY. 
Sallaz has appealed the denial of an award of attorney fees according to I.C. § 12-120(3), 
and argues that he prevailed below. However, none of the Defendants, including Sallaz, has appealed 
Judge McLaughlin's decision finding Ms. Stephen, as the prevailing party, was entitled to costs. 
AdditionaUy, on appeal, SaUaz fails to provide any argument that Judge McLaughlin erred by ruling Ms. 
Stephen was the lone prevailing party. "'The burden is on the party opposing the award to 
demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion.'" Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772, 775, 203 
P.3d 702,705 (2009), quoting, Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145 Idaho 746, 749,185 P.3d 258, 261 
(2008). On appeal, therefore, this Court must conclude as a matter of law that Judge McLaughlin was 
correct in his ruling that Ms. Stephen was a prevailing party. As Ms. Stephen was the prevailing party 
below, and that ruling cannot be disturbed on appeal, the limited issue SaUaz presents is whether the district 
court erred by not also finding that SaUaz was a prevailing party regarding his claim for attorney fees. 
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C. JUDGE MCLAUGHLIN EXERCISED IDS DISCRETION WITH REASON AND WAS 
CORRECT IN IDS RULING THAT MS. STEPHEN WAS THE LONE PREVAILING 
PARTY. 
Sallaz claims on appeal he was entitled to attorney fees according to I.C. § 12-120(3). 
However, while Sallaz argues that I.C. § 12-120(3) entitles him to attorney fees, he fails to 
establish Judge McLaughlin erred when he concluded Sallaz was not a prevailing party, a requisite 
this Court has stated, to an award of attorney fees lUlder this statute. Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 
903,204 P.3d 1114 (2009). 
1. Judge McLaughlin Applied The Correct Legal Standard, Acted Within His Discretion 
And Consistently With That Standard. 
"When examining whether a trial court abused its discretion, this Court considers whether 
the trial court: (I) perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer bOlUldaries of 
this discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available 
to it; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 915, 
204 P.3d 11 14,1126 (2009). 
The "legal standard" applicable to evaluating the prevailing party issue is contained in 
Ru1e 54( d)(l )(B), IRCP. 
(B) Prevailing Party. In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party 
and entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final 
judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective 
parties. The trial court in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an 
action prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may 
apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner 
after considering all of the issues and claims involved in the action and the resu1tant 
judgment or judgments obtained. (Emphasis added) 
Interpreting, Rule 54(d)(J)(B), IRCP, this Court has established an "overall view" standard 
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for lower courts to apply when evaluating the prevailing party issue. "In determining which party 
prevailed in an action where there are claims and counterclaims between opposing parties, the 
court determines who prevailed 'in the action.' That is, the prevailing party question is examined 
and determinedfrom an overall view, not a claim-by-claim analysis." Eighteen Mile Ranch v. 
Nord Excavating, 141 Idaho 716, 719,117 P.3d 130, 133 (2005). (Emphasis added) 
In support of its "overall view" standard, the Eighteen Mile Ranch Court identified the 
following language from Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp., 106 Idaho 687, 682 P.2d 640 (Ct.App.1984), 
which the trial court had quoted in its decision below. 
Mere dismissal of a claim without trial does not necessarily mean that the party 
against whom the claim was made is a prevailing party for the purpose of awarding 
costs and fees. 
Where, as here, there are claims, counterclaims and cross-claims, the mere fact that 
a party is successfol in asserting or defeating a single claim does not mandate an 
award of foes to the prevailing party on that claim. The rule does not require that. It 
mandates an award of fees only to the party or parties who prevail "in the action." 
(Emphasis added) 
The Eighteen Mile Ranch Court continued this quoted language accurately identified the 
relevant law, but reversed because the district court had "misinterpreted it." 
In the district court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment, Judge 
McLaughlin concluded, after considering the parties' respective claims and defenses and the 
particular relief sought, "that the Plaintiff has prevailed in these proceedings and is entitled to a 
judgment in the amount of $27,435.00." Judge McLaughlin properly refused to conclude "the 
mere fact" Sallaz was successful in defeating a single claim entitled him to prevailing-party status. 
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2. Judge McLaughlin Reached His Decision That Ms. Stephen Was The Lone Prevailing 
Par1y By An Exercise Of Reason. 
Judge McLaughlin reasoned that notwithstanding he denied Ms. Stephen the relief she 
sought against Sallaz, individually, she did prevail against Sallaz' law finn in which he was a 
"member." (R., p. 64, LL. 5-9.) Judge McLaughlin considered that while Sallaz was successful 
in his defense, he was not as successful as Ms. Stephen, who prevailed on all claims except her 
claim against Sallaz. 
The reality, Judge McLaughlin recoguized, was while Sallaz may have escaped liability 
directly, he lost indirectly, because his finn was liable. Applying the "overall view" standard, 
Judge McLaughlin, through an exercise of reason, properly ruled that Ms. Stephen was the lone 
prevailing party below. 
D. SALLAZ DID NOT RECEIVE "THE MOST FAVORABLE OUTCOME" BECAUSE 
HIS LAW FIRM LOST. 
Sallaz argues he obtained "all the relief that it was possible for him to obtain" and suggests 
therefore as a matter of law he was should have been deemed to have prevailed in the case. 
However, that contention ignores the fact that while Sallaz may have escaped liability 
individually, he still lost the war, so to speak, because, as discussed above, his law finn ultimately 
lost. 
While this case is somewhat similar to Eighteen Mile Ranch v. Nord Excavating, 141 
Idaho 716, 117 P 3d 130 (2005), it is distinguishable because unlike the Nords, Sallaz did not 
obtain the same outcome as did the Nords and their company. In Nord, the defendants included 
the corporation, (Nord Excavating) and its owners Darrin and Reed Nord individually, Casey 
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Nord, Darrin's wife, and the company's bookkeeper. Here, the Defendants included the law fum 
and the only two attorneys practicing in that firm. The Nord case plaintiff failed in all of the 
individual claims against the Nords, it failed in its claim against the Nord's excavating company, 
and it failed in its defense of Nord Excavating's counterclaim. Despite this outcome, however, the 
district court found that none of the parties prevailed. 
On appeal, this Court reversed and ruled, "the prevailing party question is examined and 
determined from an overall view, not a claim-by-claim basis." Eighteen Mile Ranch v. Nord 
Excavating, 141 Idaho 716, 719,117 P.3d 130, 133 (2005). Applying the "overall view" standard, 
the Supreme Court then found both Nord Excavating and the individual Nords were the prevailing 
parties. Justice J. Jones, writing for the Court, used a baseball analogy when explaining his 
reasoning. 
Id. 
Avoiding liability is a significant benefit to a defendant. In baseball, it is said that a 
walk is as good as a hit. The latter, of course, is more exciting. In litigation, 
avoiding liability is as good for a defendant as winning a money judgment is for a 
plaintiff. The point is, while a plaintiff with a large money judgment may be more 
exalted than a defendant who simply walks out of court no worse for the wear, 
courts must not ignore the value of a successful defense. 
The analogy is equally applicable here, but in Nord, both the players and the team won. 
Sallaz may have "walked" individually, but unlike the Nords, Sallaz' team ultimately lost. 
Consequently, Sallaz did not leave the court (or field) "no worse for the wear." Uulike the 
individual Nords, Sallaz did not obtain the "most favorable outcome," as he contends on appeal, as 
under the circumstances, the most favorable outcome that Sallaz could have obtained would have 
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been total victory, personally and for his firm. 
E. MS. STEPHEN IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL. 
Ms. Stephen requests attorney fees according to I.C. § 12-120(3), Rule 41, JAR, and City 
o/McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 201 P.3d 629 (2009), and costs according to Rule 40, IAR if 
she is the prevailing party on appeal. 
v. 
ARGUMENT-CROSS APPEAL 
A. JUDGE MCLAUGHLIN ERRED BY REFUSING TO AWARD COSTS MS. STEPHEN 
INCURRED FOR HER GUARDIAN AD LITEM. 
Ms. Stephen timely filed her motion for costs, according to Rule 54( d)(l), IRCP, and 
included a claim under Ru1e 54(d)(I)(D), IRCP (Discretionary Costs) for reimbursement for the 
cost to employ the guardian ad litem the Court had ordered to represent her. Ms. Stephen 
believed the cost for Mr. Wallace's services were "necessary and exceptional costs reasonably 
incurred" because the Court ordered Mr. Wallace to act as a guardian. 
At the hearing on January 15,2009, Ms. Stephen's counsel realized that the documents 
that identified and confirmed Mr. Wallace's time and fees were not attached to the motion. 
Unfortunately, Plaintiff's counsel did not discover this oversight before the hearing as none of the 
Defendants filed substantive objections to Ms. Stephen's claim for these costs. 
Although Judge McLaughlin ordered Mr. Wallace to act as a guardian, Judge McLaughlin 
refused to award any of the $7,500.00 fee Mr. Wallace charged. During oral argument, Judge 
McLaughlin conceded he did not expect Mr. Wallace "to do it pro bono," (rR., p. 647, LL. 5-7), 
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but indicated his concern about the amount charged. 
In the district court's Memorandum Decision entered on February 9,2009, Judge 
McLaughlin identified that he was denying the request for Mr. Wallace's fees as discretionary 
costs because Ms. Stephen failed to present a "billing or other document setting forth a specific 
itemization of the fees that constitute $7,500.00 charged by Mr. Wallace." (R., p. 64, LL. 25-25, 
and p. 65, LL. 1-2.) However, post hearing, Plaintiffs Counsel filed a motion to reconsider and 
presented the very documents the Court indicated were necessary, but that were missing from the 
initial motion. Notwithstanding the additional information, Judge McLaughlin summarily denied 
the motion and refused to consider the additional evidence. (R., p. 80.) 
On appeal, Ms. Stephen argues that it is never the proper exercise of a court's discretion to 
refuse to consider relevant evidence. The district court indicated he did not expect Mr. Wallace to 
work for free, but then refused to award any costs for Mr. Wallace's services. The costs for the 
guardian ad litem were "necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred" in this litigation and 
it was error for the district court not to award Ms. Stephen these costs under the unique 
circumstances of the case. 
B. MS. STEPHEN IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ACCORDING TO I.C. § 12-
120(3). 
Judge McLaughlin ruled that Ms. Stephen was the lone prevailing party below, and 
thereafter, she timely filed a motion for attorney fees and identified Rule 54( e), IRCP and I.C. § 
12-121. Ms. Stephen also filed the requisite affidavit in support of her motion, in which her 
attorney provided a detailed accounting of the time spent on the case and the attorney fees 
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charged. Ms. Stephen did not however seek attorney fees according to I.C. § 12-120(3), relying 
on Rice v. Lister, 132 Idaho 897, 980 P.2d 561 (1999), which she believed was the controlling law 
when she filed her motion. 
In Sallaz' motion for attomey fees, Sallaz listed LC. § 12-120(3) as a basis for entitlement to 
attorney fees, but provided no argument or case law to support this claim. 
Sallaz did not file any objection to the amount of attorney fees Ms. Stephen claimed, to the 
hourly rate charged, or in any manner to the work performed on the case by Ms. Stephen's 
counsel. 
After the parties had filed their respective motions for costs and attorney fees, and after 
oral argument, this Court issued its decision in City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 20 I P.3d 
629 (2009) on January 22, 2009. 
Judge McLaughlin was the presiding judge in the Buxton case. 
Two weeks after the Buxton decision, Judge McLaughlin issued his opinion in which he 
denied all requests for attorney fees, and specified that this legal malpractice case did not involve a 
"commercial transaction." 
This case does no fall within section 12-120 because the amount pled was not 
$25,000.00 or less. Mr. Sallaz in his individual capacity did not have a contractual 
relationship with the Plaintiff, and the claim was not based on a commercial 
transaction or a personal injury. See. LC. § 12-120(3). Therefore, Mr. Sallaz is not 
entitled to fees under 12-120. (R. pp. 66-67.) 
The Buxton decision became fmal on February 12,2009, 21days after it was aunounced, 
and after Judge McLaughlin enteredjudgrnent denying all attorney fees. 
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1. Because Attorney Fees Are Mandatory In Attorney Malpractice Cases, Judge 
McLaughlin Should Have Awarded Attorney Fees According To Buxton Because Ms. 
Stephen Was The Prevailing Party. 
Ms. Stephen had timely filed a request for attorney fees and identified Rule 54( e), lRCP as 
the basis for her entitlement to fees. 
Rule 54(e)(l), IRCP. Attorney fees. 
In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees, which at the 
discretion of the court may include paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or parties 
as defined in Rule 54( d)( 1 )(B), when provided for by any statute or contract. 
(Emphasis added) 
As noted previously, the parties had tried their case and submitted their proposed findings 
of facts conclusions oflaw, Judge McLaughlin had entered his findings of facts and conclusions of 
law, the parties had submitted their various post-trial motions, including their respective claims for 
costs and attorney fees, and Judge McLaughlin had conduced a hearing on the various post-trial 
motions on January 15,2009; before this Court issued its decision in Buxton on January 22, 2009. 
Judge McLaughlin then ruled on February 9, 2009 that the case did not involve a commercial 
transaction. 
This Court has held previously, when the case involved a commercial transaction, the trial 
court could award attorney fees when at least one party claimed the case involved a commercial 
transaction, and the commercial transaction "compromise[ d] the gravamen of the lawsuit." Great 
Plains Equipment Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 471, 36 P.3d 218,223 (2001). 
To satisfY the "gravamen" test, the "commercial transaction must be integral to the claim and 
constitute a basis on which the party is attempting to recover." Id. 
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As the Court noted in City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 201 P.3d 629 (2009), it had 
denied claims for attorney fees "from time to time" under I.C. § 12-120(3) when the case involved 
a commercial transaction, but when the "claim sounded in tort." While the Buxton court did not 
specifY the basis for its selectivity "from time to time," it appeared the Court was alluding to its 
application of the "gravamen" test when analyzing prior cases, including Blimka v. My Web 
Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 152 P.3d 594 (2007). 
Blimka involved a fraud and breach of warranty claims against a wholesaler who shipped 
defective jeans to a buyer in Idaho. The Blimka Court referred to the "gravamen" test in its 
decision, but did not state it was overruling or rejecting that test. The fraud at issue in Blimpka 
related directly to the contract or "transaction," and it was that contract or transaction that 
"constituted a basis upon which the party is attempting to recover." Under those facts, it appeared 
the Blimpka Court applied the gravamen test in reaching its decision. 
After Blimpka, this Court specifically identified and applied the "gravamen" test in 
Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 196 P.3d 341 (2008). "The critical test in determining 
whether a civil action is for a commercial transaction is whether the commercial transaction 
comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit; it must be integral to the claim and constitute the basis 
upon which the party is attempting to recover." Johannsen, 146 Idaho at 432, citing Esser Elec. v. 
Lost River Ballistics Technologies, Inc., 145 Idaho 912, 921,188 P.3d 854, 863 (2008). The 
claims in Johannsen arose directly from a written operating agreement between the parties. 
While the underlying claim in a legal malpractice must be predicated on an attorney-client 
relationship or contract, the basis upon which the aggrieved party is attempting to recover, as this 
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Court has stated several times, is in tort, not on the contract. A claim for legal malpractice would 
not meet the gravamen test because it is uulikely the parties to an attorney - client contract 
considered the potential for a legal malpractice claim when they contracted. (Assuming a client 
believed his attorney would possibly commit malpractice, then that client probably would seek 
other counsel?) In a legal malpractice case, the aggrieved client is not seeking to enforce the 
attorney - client contract, because committing or not committing malpractice is not a term of such 
contract. The aggrieved client is seeking recovery in tort, separate and apart from the contract, so 
the contract or commercial transaction is not "integral to the claim and [does not] constitute the 
basis upon which the party is attempting to recover." Consequently, until the Buxton decision, 
Ms. Stephen's tort claim did not appear to satisfy the "gravamen" test, which this Court continued 
to apply after Blimpka. Following the Buxton decision, however, there is no question that the 
prevailing party in a legal malpractice case is entitled to attorney fees according to I.C. § 12-
120(3) regardless of whether or not the tort claim met the "gravamen" test. 
Ms. Stephen identified Rule 54( e), IRCP in her timely request for attorney fees, filed the 
requisite affidavit of her counsel in support of her claim, and she was the prevailing party below. 
Now that this Court has ruled attorney fees in legal malpractice cases are mandatory, and therefore 
are "provided for by statute" in I.C. § 12-120(3), Judge McLaughlin erred by not awarding Ms. 
Stephen attorney fees according to I.C. § 12-120(3), despite her timely request for fees according 
to Rule 54(e), IRCP. 
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2. Ms. Stephen Was Not Required To Claim Entitlement To Attorney Fees Below 
According To I.C. § 12-120(3). 
When any party claims the case involved a commercial transaction, that claim triggers 
application ofLC. § 12-120(3) to the case and to all parties. 
I.C. § 12-120 Attorney's Fees in Civil Actions. 
*** 
(3) In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, negotiable 
instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, 
merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by 
law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the court, 
to be taxed and collected as costs. (Emphasis added) 
Although Ms. Stephen did not specifically request attorney fees according to I.C. § 12-
120(3), she is entitled to recover under this statute because Sallaz' claim for these fees "triggered" 
the application ofthis statute entitling any prevailing party to recover. "A prevailing party may 
rely on I.C. s 12-120(3) if pled by another party for recovery of attorney fees if it is warranted 
under the statute." Great Plains Equipment Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 471, 
36 P.3d 218, 223 (2001). (Emphasis added) 
Prior to the Great Plains Equipment case, the Supreme Court addressed entitlement to 
recover under I.C. § 12-120(3) even when a party had not specifically sought fees under this 
statute. The Supreme Court considered the clear and mandatory language ofI.C. § 12-120(3), and 
concluded that if any party claimed a contractual relationship existed or that the case involved a 
commercial transaction, then that claim "triggers the application of [I.e. § 12-120(3)] ... " to all 
parties. Magic Lantern Productions, Inc. v. Dolsot, 126 Idaho 805, 808, 892 P.2d 480, 483 
(1995), quoting Farmers Nat. Bankv. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 878 P.2d 762 (1994). The trial court 
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has authority to award attorney fees to the prevailing party or parties, once the application ofI.C. § 
12-120(3) to the case is triggered, even if the prevailing party had not cited I.C. § 12-120(3) as a 
basis to recover attorney fees, because I.C. § 12-120(3) applies to the case, not just to the 
respective parties' claim. 
After the Supreme Court issued its Buxton decision, the attorney fees issue was still before 
the district court. Presumably, Judge McLaughlin reviewed the Buxton decision because as the 
presiding judge below, he personally received a copy of the opinion when issued. Rule 38(a), 
IAR. While Judge McLaughlin correctly denied Sallaz' motion for attorney fees under I.C. § 12-
120(3), he also ruled that this legal malpractice case did not involve a "commercial transaction," 
even after the Buxton decision. At that point, there did not appear to be any basis to move for 
reconsideration, and the parties proceeded with their respective appeals. 
Ms. Stephen agrees with Sallaz' contention that attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) are 
mandatory. Ms. Stephen therefore is entitled to attorney fees under this statute because Sallaz 
"triggered" application ofLC. § 12-120(3), because she alone was the prevailing party, and 
ultimately, because of the Buxton decision. 
Additionally, Ms. Stephen timely filed a request for attorney fees under Rule 54(e)(l), 
IRCP, and filed the requisite "affidavit of the attorney stating the basis and method of computation 
of the attorney fees claimed," according to Rule 54(e)(5), IRCP. Sallaz and the other Defendants, 
thus, had an opportunity to file objections to Ms. Stephen's claim, according to Rule 54( e)( 6), 
IRCP, which provides that a party may object to " ... the allowance of attorney fees, or to the 
amount thereof, .... " 
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After the Buxton decision, as attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) were mandatory in legal 
malpractice actions, the district court had no discretion but to award attorney to the prevailing 
party. Accordingly, under the circumstances, although Sallaz could have objected to the "amount" 
of the fees Ms. Stephen requested, there was no basis for any objection to the "allowance" of fees. 
In other words, in his response to this cross appeal, if Sallaz claims he was somehow prejudiced 
because Ms. Stephen did not pursue attorney fees below according to I.C. § 12-120(3), thereby 
allowing him to object, that claim would be baseless. While Sallaz could have objected to the 
"amount" ofthe fees claimed, [he did not], any objection to the "allowance" for fees according to 
I.C. § 12-120(3), would have been rejected as after the Buxton decision the trial court had no 
discretion, other than to determine who prevailed, when awarding attorney fees. 
Moreover, based on the Great Plains Equipment and Magic Lantern Productions cases 
cited above, Sallaz should have understood that claiming I.e. § 12-120(3) applied to the case 
allowed the district court to award attorney fees to the prevailing party, regardless of whether the 
prevailing party sough fees under this statute. Consequently, on appeal, there is no basis for Sallaz 
to claim prejudice as he raised I.C. § 12-120(3) below. 
Ms. Stephen requests that this Court remand to the district court with direction that the 
district court award Ms. Stephen, as the prevailing party, attorney fees according to I.C. § 12-
120(3). Following Buxton, a ruling that a legal malpractice case does not involve a commercial 
transaction thereby "triggering" application ofLC. § 12-120(3) is clearly error. 
C. MS. STEPHEN IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON HER CROSS APPEAL. 
Ms. Stephen also requests attorney fees according to I.C. § 12-120(3), City of McCall v. 
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Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 201 P 3d 629 (2009), and Ru1e 41, IAR; and costs according to Rule 40, 




1. As Appellant Sallaz failed to timely appeal the district court's decision denying 
Sallaz' claim he had prevailed below, this Court shou1d summarily deny his appeal. 
2. The district court correctly ru1ed that Ms. Stephen was the lone prevailing party below 
and this Court shou1d not distnrb that decision on appeal. As Appellant Sallaz was not a 
prevailing party below, he is not entitled to attorney fees according to I.C. § 12-120(3), and the 
Court should dismiss his appeal. 
3. As the prevailing party on this appeal, Ms. Stephen is entitled to attorney fees and 
costs as claimed herein. 
CROSS APPEAL 
1. The district court abused its discretion when it ruled that Ms. Stephen was not entitled 
to recover as discretionary costs the fees she paid to her guardian ad litem, who the court 
appointed to represent her. 
2. Ms. Stephen was entitled to an award of attorney fees according to I.C. § 12-120(3) 
after City of McCall v. Buxton, as she was the prevailing party in her legal malpractice case. 
3. As the prevailing party on this cross appeal, Ms. Stephen is entitled to attorney fees 
and costs as claimed herein. 
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